Cryptographic protocols: design and analysis

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Notation

A, B, C, S: names of legitimate parties.
(Short for: Alice, Bob, client, server.)

M: name of a malicious attacker. (Short for: Mallet.)

Notation

$$1.\ A \rightarrow B : x$$

The above means:

1. Protocol designer intended the message x to be sent by party A to party B.
2. This message was intended to be sent first in a series of several.

Caveats

$$1.\ A \rightarrow B : x$$

Do note:

1. B only receives the message x, not who it came from.
   (Thus, messages should include the sender's name if the recipient needs to know it.)
2. There is no guarantee that A, the network, or the adversary will behave as intended.
   (Thus, messages might be intercepted, modified, re-ordered, etc.)

Warmup

Establishing a secure channel with a challenge-response protocol:

1. $A \rightarrow B: \quad A$
2. $B \rightarrow A: \quad N_B$
3. $A \rightarrow B: \quad [N_B]_{K_A^{-1}}$
4. $A \rightarrow B: \quad \{\text{message}\}_{K_B}$
5. $A \rightarrow B: \quad \{\text{message}'\}_{K_B}$

$\ldots$

Can you spot the flaw?

Denning-Sacco #1

Key exchange between A, B, with the aid of an online certification server S.

1. $A \rightarrow S$: A, B
2. $S \rightarrow A$: $\text{cert}_A, \text{cert}_B$
3. $A \rightarrow B$: $\text{cert}_A, \text{cert}_B, \{[k_{AB}, T_A]_{K_A^{-1}}\}_{K_B}$

Can you spot the flaw?

Breaking Denning-Sacco #1

Look closely:

$$3. \quad A \to B : \quad \text{cert}_A, \text{cert}_B, \{[k_{AB}, T_A]_{K_A^{-1}}\}_{K_B}$$

The key k_{AB} isn't bound to the names of the endpoints A, B.

Therefore, B can extract the quantity $[k_{AB}, T_A]_{K_A^{-1}}$ and use it to spoof A in a new connection to C, like this:

$$3'. \quad B \to C : \quad \text{cert}_A, \text{cert}_C, \{[k_{AB}, T_A]_{K_A^{-1}}\}_{K_C}$$

As a result, C mistakenly concludes he is speaking with A.

A Lesson

Moral: Be explicit. Bind all names, and all other relevant context, to every message.

Exercise: Why do so many protocols fail this way?

Credits: Abadi and Needham.

Early SSL

Key exchange with mutual authentication:

1. $A \rightarrow B: \quad \{k_{AB}\}_{K_B}$
2. $B \rightarrow A: \quad \{N_B\}_{k_{AB}}$
3. $A \rightarrow B: \quad \{\mathsf{cert}_A, [N_B]_{K_A^{-1}}\}_{k_{AB}}$

Can you spot the flaw?

Breaking early SSL

Look closely:

1. $A \rightarrow B: \ \{k_{AB}\}_{K_B}$
2. $B \rightarrow A: \ \{N_B\}_{k_{AB}}$
3. $A \rightarrow B: \ \{\text{cert}_A, [N_B]_{K_A^{-1}}\}_{k_{AB}}$

Alice will sign *anything* with her private key.

The attack on early SSL

B can open a connection to C and pretend to be A, as follows:

1'. $B \rightarrow C : \{k_{BC}\}_{K_C}$

2'. $C \rightarrow A : \{N_C\}_{k_{BC}}$

When C challenges B with nonce N_C, Bob sends $N_B = N_C$ back to A and uses her as an oracle.

1. $A \rightarrow B : \{k_{AB}\}_{K_B}$
2. $B \rightarrow A : \{N_C\}_{k_{AB}}$
3. $A \rightarrow B : \{\text{cert}_A, [N_C]_{K_A^{-1}}\}_{k_{AB}}$

A will sign *anything*, so B extracts $[N_C]_{K_A^{-1}}$ and he's in:

3'. $B \rightarrow C : \{\text{cert}_A, [N_C]_{K_A^{-1}}\}_{k_{AB}}$

Fixing early SSL

Fix: replace $[N_B]_{K_A^{-1}}$ with $[A, B, N_A, N_B]_{K_A^{-1}}$.

1. $A \rightarrow B: \ \{k_{AB}\}_{K_B}$
2. $B \rightarrow A: \ \{N_B\}_{k_{AB}}$
3. $A \rightarrow B: \ \{\text{cert}_A, [A, B, N_A, N_B]_{K_A^{-1}}\}_{k_{AB}}$

Moral: Don't let yourself be used as a signing oracle. Add your own randomness—and bind names—before signing.

Credits: Abadi and Needham.

GSM challenge-response

A is cellphone handset, B is a base station.

$$\begin{array}{ll} 1. & B \rightarrow A: \quad N_B \\ 2. & A \rightarrow B: \quad A, [N_B]_{K_{AB}^{-1}}, \{\text{data}\}_k \end{array}$$

where $k = f(K_{AB}, N_B)$ is the voice privacy key.

Can you spot the weakness?

X.509 standard #1

Sending a signed, encrypted message to B:

$$1. \quad A \rightarrow B: \quad A, [T_A, B, \{\text{message}\}_{K_B}]_{K_A^{-1}}$$

This has a subtle issue, depending upon how it is used.

Breaking X.509 standard #1

Look again:

$$1. \quad A \rightarrow B: \quad A, [T_A, B, \{\text{message}\}_{K_B}]_{K_A^{-1}}$$

There's no reason to believe the sender was ever aware of the contents of the message. Signatures imply approval but not authorship.

An Attack on X.509 #1

Example: Proving yourself by sending a password.

Attacker M intercepts Alice's encrypted password:

$$1. \quad A \to B: \quad A, [T_A, B, \{\text{password}\}_{K_B}]_{K_A^{-1}}$$

Then M extracts $\{\text{password}\}_{K_B}$, and sends

$$1'. \quad M \to B: \quad M, [T_M, B, \{\text{password}\}_{K_B}]_{K_M^{-1}}$$

Now M is in, without needing to know the password.

Another Attack on X.509 #1

Example: Secure auctions.

The same attack provides an easy way for M to send in a copy of A's bid under his own name, without needing to know what A's bid was.

Lessons

An important difference between

- Authentication as *endorsement* (i.e., taking responsibility).
- Authentication as a way of *claiming credit*.

Encrypting before signing provides a secure way of assigning responsibility, but an insecure way to establishing credit.

Moral: sign before encrypting.

Credits: Abadi and Needham.

TMN

A, B establish a shared key k_B using the help of a fast server S:

1. $A \rightarrow S: \quad \{k_A\}_{K_S}$
2. $B \rightarrow S: \quad \{k_B\}_{K_S}$
3. $S \rightarrow A: \quad k_A \oplus k_B$

A recovers k_B as $k_A \oplus (k_A \oplus k_B)$.

What's the flaw?

Breaking TMN

Let's play spot the oracle!

The attack: Given $\{k_B\}_{K_S}$, M, M' can conspire to recover k_B:

$$\begin{array}{lll} 1'. & M \rightarrow S: & \{k_B\}_{K_S} \\ 2'. & M' \rightarrow S: & \{k_{M'}\}_{K_S} \\ 3'. & S \rightarrow M: & k_B \oplus k_{M'} \end{array}$$

Now M, M' can recover k_B from $\{k_B\}_{K_S}$.

This lets eavesdroppers recover session keys established by other parties.

Credits: Simmons.

Goss railway protocol

A and B establish an authenticated shared key $k_{AB} = r_A \oplus r_B$:

$$\begin{array}{ll} 1. & A \rightarrow B: \quad A, \{r_A\}_{K_B} \\ 2. & B \rightarrow A: \quad B, \{r_B\}_{K_A} \end{array}$$

Do you see the subtle weakness?

Triangle attacks on Goss

If session keys sometimes leak, the system breaks.

M can recover r_A from $\{r_A\}_{K_B}$ by opening a session to B and replaying A's encrypted contribution to the key:

$$\begin{array}{ll} 1. & M \rightarrow B: \quad M, \{r_A\}_{K_B} \\ 2. & B \rightarrow M: \quad B, \{r'_B\}_{K_M} \end{array}$$

Now if M can learn k_{BM} somehow, he can compute $r_A = k_{BM} \oplus r'_B$.

Basically, if B lets session keys leak, M can use him as as a decryption oracle to obtain r_A from $\{r_A\}_{K_B}$.

Play the same games with A to recover r_B from $\{r_B\}_{K_A}$;
you then learn k_{AB}.

Credits: Burmester.

Principles for implementing protocols

Explicitness is powerful (and cheap).

If you see the mathematical notation

$$\begin{array}{ll} 1. & B \rightarrow A: \quad N_B \\ 2. & A \rightarrow B: \quad \{N_B, k_{A,B}\}_{K_A} \end{array}$$

a more robust way to implement it in practice is

1. $B \rightarrow A$: "Msg 1 from B to A of GSM protocol v1.0 is a challenge N_B."
2. $A \rightarrow B$: $\{$"Msg 2 from A to B of GSM protocol v1.0 is a response to the challenge N_B; and A asserts that the session key $k_{A,B}$ is fresh and good for communication between A and B on the session where N_B was seen."$\}_{K_A}$

(Can you see why each of the elements above are there?)

Principles for implementing protocols

Any value received as cleartext should be treated as untrustworthy: you may use it as a **hint** for performance, but don’t depend on it for security.

Minimize state; each message should be self-explanatory and (where possible) include all relevant prior context.

Principles for implementing protocols

Don’t reuse keys: for instance, signing keys and decryption keys should not be equated. Use a separate session key for each direction.

Hash everything. Each message should include the (signed?) hash of all previous messages in the interaction. This makes cut-and-paste attacks harder.

Measure twice, cut once.