Electrical Engineering
      and Computer Sciences

Electrical Engineering and Computer Sciences

COLLEGE OF ENGINEERING

UC Berkeley

A Three-Stage Colonel Blotto Game with Applications to Cyber-Physical Security

Abhishek Gupta, Galina Schwartz, Cedric Langbort, S. Shankar Sastry and Tamer Basar

EECS Department
University of California, Berkeley
Technical Report No. UCB/EECS-2014-19
March 15, 2014

http://www.eecs.berkeley.edu/Pubs/TechRpts/2014/EECS-2014-19.pdf

We consider a three-step three-player complete information Colonel Blotto game in this paper, in which the first two players fight against a common adversary. Each player is endowed with certain amount of resources at the beginning of the game, and the number of battlefields on which a player and the adversary fights is specified. The first two players are allowed to form a coalition if it improves their payoffs. In the first stage, the first two players may add battlefields and incur costs. In the second stage, the first two players may transfer resources among each other. The adversary observes this transfer, and decides on the allocation of its resources to the two battles with the players. At the third step, the adversary and the other two players fight on the updated number of battlefields and receive payoffs. We characterize the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) of the game in various parameter regions. In particular, we show that there are certain parameter regions in which if the players act according to the SPNE strategies, then (i) one of the first two players add battlefields and transfer resources to the other player (a coalition is formed), (ii) there is no addition of battlefields and no transfer of resources (no coalition is formed). We discuss the implications of the results on resource allocation for securing cyber physical systems.


BibTeX citation:

@techreport{Gupta:EECS-2014-19,
    Author = {Gupta, Abhishek and Schwartz, Galina and  Langbort, Cedric and Sastry, S. Shankar and Basar,  Tamer},
    Title = {A Three-Stage Colonel Blotto Game with Applications to Cyber-Physical Security},
    Institution = {EECS Department, University of California, Berkeley},
    Year = {2014},
    Month = {Mar},
    URL = {http://www.eecs.berkeley.edu/Pubs/TechRpts/2014/EECS-2014-19.html},
    Number = {UCB/EECS-2014-19},
    Abstract = {We consider a three-step three-player complete information Colonel Blotto game in this paper, in which the first two players fight against a common adversary. Each player is endowed with certain amount of resources at the beginning of the game, and the number of battlefields on which a player and the adversary fights is specified. The first two players are allowed to form a coalition if it improves their payoffs. In the first stage, the first two players may add battlefields and incur costs. In the second stage, the first two players may transfer resources among each other. The adversary observes this transfer, and decides on the allocation of its resources to the two battles with the players. At the third step, the adversary and the other two players fight on the updated number of battlefields and receive payoffs. We characterize the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) of the game in various parameter regions. In particular, we show that there are certain parameter regions in which if the players act according to the SPNE strategies, then (i) one of the first two players add battlefields and transfer resources to the other player (a coalition is formed), (ii) there is no addition of battlefields and no transfer of resources (no coalition is formed). We discuss the implications of the results on resource allocation for securing cyber physical systems.}
}

EndNote citation:

%0 Report
%A Gupta, Abhishek
%A Schwartz, Galina
%A  Langbort, Cedric
%A Sastry, S. Shankar
%A Basar,  Tamer
%T A Three-Stage Colonel Blotto Game with Applications to Cyber-Physical Security
%I EECS Department, University of California, Berkeley
%D 2014
%8 March 15
%@ UCB/EECS-2014-19
%U http://www.eecs.berkeley.edu/Pubs/TechRpts/2014/EECS-2014-19.html
%F Gupta:EECS-2014-19