Optimal Mixed Spectrum Auction

Alonso Silva, Fernando Beltran and Jean Walrand

EECS Department
University of California, Berkeley
Technical Report No. UCB/EECS-2013-129
July 9, 2013

http://www.eecs.berkeley.edu/Pubs/TechRpts/2013/EECS-2013-129.pdf

This work studies the revenue-maximizing auction of a single block of spectrum that can be awarded either for exclusive licensed use by one operator or reserved for unlicensed use. A number of operators bid for exclusive licensed use and a group of non-colluding agents bid to keep the spectrum unlicensed. The revenue of this auction is compared to that of a Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) auction and that of another auction recently proposed.


BibTeX citation:

@techreport{Silva:EECS-2013-129,
    Author = {Silva, Alonso and Beltran, Fernando and Walrand, Jean},
    Title = {Optimal Mixed Spectrum Auction},
    Institution = {EECS Department, University of California, Berkeley},
    Year = {2013},
    Month = {Jul},
    URL = {http://www.eecs.berkeley.edu/Pubs/TechRpts/2013/EECS-2013-129.html},
    Number = {UCB/EECS-2013-129},
    Abstract = {This work studies the revenue-maximizing auction of a single block of spectrum
that can be awarded either for exclusive licensed use by one operator
or reserved for unlicensed use. A number of operators bid for exclusive licensed use and a group of non-colluding agents bid to keep the spectrum unlicensed.
The revenue of this auction is compared to that of a Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) auction and that of another auction recently proposed.}
}

EndNote citation:

%0 Report
%A Silva, Alonso
%A Beltran, Fernando
%A Walrand, Jean
%T Optimal Mixed Spectrum Auction
%I EECS Department, University of California, Berkeley
%D 2013
%8 July 9
%@ UCB/EECS-2013-129
%U http://www.eecs.berkeley.edu/Pubs/TechRpts/2013/EECS-2013-129.html
%F Silva:EECS-2013-129