Alonso Silva and Fernando Beltran and Jean Walrand

EECS Department, University of California, Berkeley

Technical Report No. UCB/EECS-2013-129

July 9, 2013

http://www2.eecs.berkeley.edu/Pubs/TechRpts/2013/EECS-2013-129.pdf

This work studies the revenue-maximizing auction of a single block of spectrum that can be awarded either for exclusive licensed use by one operator or reserved for unlicensed use. A number of operators bid for exclusive licensed use and a group of non-colluding agents bid to keep the spectrum unlicensed. The revenue of this auction is compared to that of a Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) auction and that of another auction recently proposed.

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BibTeX citation:

@techreport{Silva:EECS-2013-129,
    Author= {Silva, Alonso and Beltran, Fernando and Walrand, Jean},
    Title= {Optimal Mixed Spectrum Auction},
    Year= {2013},
    Month= {Jul},
    Url= {http://www2.eecs.berkeley.edu/Pubs/TechRpts/2013/EECS-2013-129.html},
    Number= {UCB/EECS-2013-129},
    Abstract= {This work studies the revenue-maximizing auction of a single block of spectrum
that can be awarded either for exclusive licensed use by one operator
or reserved for unlicensed use. A number of operators bid for exclusive licensed use and a group of non-colluding agents bid to keep the spectrum unlicensed.
The revenue of this auction is compared to that of a Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) auction and that of another auction recently proposed.},
}

EndNote citation:

%0 Report
%A Silva, Alonso 
%A Beltran, Fernando 
%A Walrand, Jean 
%T Optimal Mixed Spectrum Auction
%I EECS Department, University of California, Berkeley
%D 2013
%8 July 9
%@ UCB/EECS-2013-129
%U http://www2.eecs.berkeley.edu/Pubs/TechRpts/2013/EECS-2013-129.html
%F Silva:EECS-2013-129