Electrical Engineering
      and Computer Sciences

Electrical Engineering and Computer Sciences

COLLEGE OF ENGINEERING

UC Berkeley

Optimal Mixed Spectrum Auction

Alonso Silva, Fernando Beltran and Jean Walrand

EECS Department
University of California, Berkeley
Technical Report No. UCB/EECS-2013-129
July 9, 2013

http://www.eecs.berkeley.edu/Pubs/TechRpts/2013/EECS-2013-129.pdf

This work studies the revenue-maximizing auction of a single block of spectrum that can be awarded either for exclusive licensed use by one operator or reserved for unlicensed use. A number of operators bid for exclusive licensed use and a group of non-colluding agents bid to keep the spectrum unlicensed. The revenue of this auction is compared to that of a Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) auction and that of another auction recently proposed.


BibTeX citation:

@techreport{Silva:EECS-2013-129,
    Author = {Silva, Alonso and Beltran, Fernando and Walrand, Jean},
    Title = {Optimal Mixed Spectrum Auction},
    Institution = {EECS Department, University of California, Berkeley},
    Year = {2013},
    Month = {Jul},
    URL = {http://www.eecs.berkeley.edu/Pubs/TechRpts/2013/EECS-2013-129.html},
    Number = {UCB/EECS-2013-129},
    Abstract = {This work studies the revenue-maximizing auction of a single block of spectrum
that can be awarded either for exclusive licensed use by one operator
or reserved for unlicensed use. A number of operators bid for exclusive licensed use and a group of non-colluding agents bid to keep the spectrum unlicensed.
The revenue of this auction is compared to that of a Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) auction and that of another auction recently proposed.}
}

EndNote citation:

%0 Report
%A Silva, Alonso
%A Beltran, Fernando
%A Walrand, Jean
%T Optimal Mixed Spectrum Auction
%I EECS Department, University of California, Berkeley
%D 2013
%8 July 9
%@ UCB/EECS-2013-129
%U http://www.eecs.berkeley.edu/Pubs/TechRpts/2013/EECS-2013-129.html
%F Silva:EECS-2013-129