Optimal Mixed Spectrum Auction
Alonso Silva, Fernando Beltran and Jean Walrand
EECS Department
University of California, Berkeley
Technical Report No. UCB/EECS-2013-129
July 9, 2013
http://www.eecs.berkeley.edu/Pubs/TechRpts/2013/EECS-2013-129.pdf
This work studies the revenue-maximizing auction of a single block of spectrum that can be awarded either for exclusive licensed use by one operator or reserved for unlicensed use. A number of operators bid for exclusive licensed use and a group of non-colluding agents bid to keep the spectrum unlicensed. The revenue of this auction is compared to that of a Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) auction and that of another auction recently proposed.
BibTeX citation:
@techreport{Silva:EECS-2013-129,
Author = {Silva, Alonso and Beltran, Fernando and Walrand, Jean},
Title = {Optimal Mixed Spectrum Auction},
Institution = {EECS Department, University of California, Berkeley},
Year = {2013},
Month = {Jul},
URL = {http://www.eecs.berkeley.edu/Pubs/TechRpts/2013/EECS-2013-129.html},
Number = {UCB/EECS-2013-129},
Abstract = {This work studies the revenue-maximizing auction of a single block of spectrum
that can be awarded either for exclusive licensed use by one operator
or reserved for unlicensed use. A number of operators bid for exclusive licensed use and a group of non-colluding agents bid to keep the spectrum unlicensed.
The revenue of this auction is compared to that of a Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) auction and that of another auction recently proposed.}
}
EndNote citation:
%0 Report %A Silva, Alonso %A Beltran, Fernando %A Walrand, Jean %T Optimal Mixed Spectrum Auction %I EECS Department, University of California, Berkeley %D 2013 %8 July 9 %@ UCB/EECS-2013-129 %U http://www.eecs.berkeley.edu/Pubs/TechRpts/2013/EECS-2013-129.html %F Silva:EECS-2013-129