Electrical Engineering
      and Computer Sciences

Electrical Engineering and Computer Sciences

COLLEGE OF ENGINEERING

UC Berkeley

Efficiency of Selfish Investments in Network Security

Libin Jiang, Venkat Anantharam and Jean Walrand

EECS Department
University of California, Berkeley
Technical Report No. UCB/EECS-2008-77
June 3, 2008

http://www.eecs.berkeley.edu/Pubs/TechRpts/2008/EECS-2008-77.pdf

Internet security does not only depend on the security-related investments of individual users, but also on how these users affect each other. In a non-cooperative environment, each user chooses a level of investment to minimize its own security risk plus the cost of investment. Not surprisingly, this selfish behavior often results in undesirable security degradation of the overall system. In this paper, we first characterize the price of anarchy (POA) of network security under two models: an "Effective-investment" model, and a "Bad-traffic" model. We give insight on how the POA depends on the network topology, individual users' cost functions, and their mutual influence. We also introduce the concept of "weighted POA" to bound the region of all feasible payoffs. In a repeated game, on the other hand, users have more incentive to cooperate for their long term interests. We consider the socially best outcome that can be supported by the repeated game, and give a ratio between this outcome and the social optimum. Although the paper focuses on Internet security, many results are generally applicable to games with positive externalities.


BibTeX citation:

@techreport{Jiang:EECS-2008-77,
    Author = {Jiang, Libin and Anantharam, Venkat and Walrand, Jean},
    Title = {Efficiency of Selfish Investments in Network Security},
    Institution = {EECS Department, University of California, Berkeley},
    Year = {2008},
    Month = {Jun},
    URL = {http://www.eecs.berkeley.edu/Pubs/TechRpts/2008/EECS-2008-77.html},
    Number = {UCB/EECS-2008-77},
    Abstract = {Internet security does not only depend on the security-related investments of individual users, but also on how these users affect each other. In a non-cooperative environment, each user chooses a level of investment to minimize its own security risk plus the cost of investment. Not surprisingly, this selfish behavior often results in undesirable security degradation of the overall system. In this paper, we first characterize the price of anarchy (POA) of network security under two models: an "Effective-investment" model, and a "Bad-traffic" model. We give insight on how the POA depends on the network topology, individual users' cost functions, and their mutual influence. We also introduce the concept of "weighted POA" to bound the region of all feasible payoffs. In a repeated game, on the other hand, users have more incentive to cooperate for their long term interests. We consider the socially best outcome that can be supported by the repeated game, and give a ratio between this outcome and the social optimum. Although the paper focuses on Internet security, many results are generally applicable to games with positive externalities.}
}

EndNote citation:

%0 Report
%A Jiang, Libin
%A Anantharam, Venkat
%A Walrand, Jean
%T Efficiency of Selfish Investments in Network Security
%I EECS Department, University of California, Berkeley
%D 2008
%8 June 3
%@ UCB/EECS-2008-77
%U http://www.eecs.berkeley.edu/Pubs/TechRpts/2008/EECS-2008-77.html
%F Jiang:EECS-2008-77